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Abstract
I analyze the business cycle and welfare eﬀects of public information disclosures in a model
of monopolistic competition among heterogeneously informed ﬁrms. Information heterogeneity
leads to potentially important delays in price adjustment and ampliﬁes the real eﬀects of mon-
etary shocks. Public announcements reduce adjustment delays, but come at the cost of higher
volatility due to informational noise; on this basis, Morris and Shin (2002) have recently argued
that public information disclosures may be harmful. In contrast, I show that such announce-
ments always improve welfare because they lead to lower price dispersion. Access to more precise
private information, on the other hand, may harm welfare.
More generally, I argue that the welfare eﬀects of public and private information provision
can be understood by comparing equilibrium strategies to an eﬃcient social planner benchmark.
The diﬀerent and contrasting welfare results in Morris and Shin (2002), here and in other related
papers can thus be reconciled as being the consequence of diﬀerent distortions between the social
optimum and the equilibrium use of information.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Should central banks or other government agencies always commit to provide timely and accurate
information about economic fundamentals? In principle, the provision of better information should
allow for a better inference of sector-speciﬁc and aggregate shocks and enable markets to allocate
resources more eﬃciently across sectors and over time - provided that markets make eﬃcient use
of the available information. As a challenge to this argument, Morris and Shin (2002 - henceforth
MS) have recently suggested that public information may carry too much weight in individual
decisions and thereby lead to ineﬃciently high volatility in the aggregate; consequently, such public
information disclosures may be welfare-reducing. They formalize this idea in a ‘beauty contest’
game in which a large number of agents with access to heterogeneous, private sources of information,
and hence diﬀerent beliefs about economic conditions, all seek to coordinate their decisions. This
stylized game is intended to capture important strategic features of macro-economic models with
decision complementarities, such as business cycle models of incomplete nominal adjustment.
In this paper, I provide a detailed analysis of the business cycle and welfare eﬀects of informa-
tion heterogeneity and public information disclosures. I examine the argument made by MS in the
context of a speciﬁc application, namely an incomplete nominal adjustment model with monopo-
listically competitive ﬁrms. Although this environment shares all the salient features emphasized
by MS, it does not share their main welfare conclusion; instead, public information disclosures are
unambiguously welfare-improving, however, improved access to private sources of information may
harm welfare. In line with this ﬁrst ﬁnding, I show that in equilibrium, information is used ineﬃ-
ciently (in a sense that will be made precise below): although equilibrium strategies pay too much
attention to public information disclosures, and too little to private information sources, relative
to their respective information content, a benevolent planner would like ﬁrms to rely even more on
public and less on private sources of information.
More generally, I argue that the welfare eﬀects of public and private information provision
can be understood by analogy with the classical welfare analysis of competitive market alloca-
tions. As the relevant eﬃciency benchmark, I introduce the Decentralized Information Optimum
(DIO), which is established as the solution to a planner’s problem, where the planner can dictate
to all agents, how they should act conditional on their information sets.1 When DIO and equilib-
1If instead the planner’s problem were formulated as a direct revelation mechanism, the planner could completely
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rium strategies coincide, the equilibrium makes eﬃcient use of the available information, and any
improvement in information is welfare-improving. Any divergence between DIO and equilibrium
strategies is indicative of ineﬃciencies in the use of information, and, if these ineﬃciencies become
suﬃciently large, they cause certain types of information disclosures to become socially undesirable.
Divergences between the DIO and equilibrium strategies in turn can be traced to speciﬁct y p e so f
externalities in the use of the available information, and diﬀerent externalities can account for the
diﬀerent and contrasting welfare results in MS and the present paper.
I begin my formal analysis with a model of monopolistic price competition, in which, in the
spirit of Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972), incomplete nominal adjustment emerges endogenously be-
cause ﬁrms are imperfectly informed about the underlying monetary shocks and may have access to
heterogeneous sources of information, as suggested by MS. Within this model, I ﬁrst derive the prin-
cipal business cycle implications of information heterogeneity and public information disclosures.
Following Woodford (2002), Theorem 1 shows that heterogeneity in information, when coupled with
a complementarity in price-setting, may lead to substantial delays in price adjustment, even when
the underlying shocks are precisely observed. Public information disclosures reduce these delays,
but since the ﬁrms’ pricing strategies pay too much attention to public announcements (relative to
their information content), the noise inherent in such disclosures may increase, rather than decrease
output volatility.
I then address the main welfare questions within the context of this model. I decompose the
equilibrium welfare level into components that are due to output volatility, and components that are
due to price dispersion; the latter leads to an ineﬃcient allocation of resources and a deadweight
loss in output. As we already observed, better public information may increase output volatility,
but it always reduces price dispersion. Better private information, on the other hand, always
reduces output volatility, but it may increase price dispersion. The aggregate welfare implications
of public information disclosures or improved access to private information are then given by the
combined eﬀect on output volatility and price dispersion. While this may appear ambiguous at ﬁrst
sight, Theorem 2 resolves the ambiguity and shows that public information disclosures are always
beneﬁcial: the positive eﬀect of disclosures on price dispersion always outweighs the potentially
negative eﬀect on volatility. Better private information, on the other hand, may be harmful. Again
this happens, because price dispersion dominates the welfare considerations, which this time is for
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the worse. In summary, the stark contrast between MS and the present results arises because in the
present context overall welfare is determined mostly by price dispersion, not by output volatility.
Next, I compute the DIO in the context of this price-setting model (Theorem 3). The DIO
assigns higher weights to public signals and lower weights to private information, than equilibrium
strategies. Thus, even though equilibrium strategies pay too much attention to public information
relative to its information content, thereby increasing volatility, the planner would want to increase
volatility even further, since this also reduces price dispersion.
To understand these results, it is useful to examine further how the use of information in
equilibrium aﬀects these two welfare components. The conditioning of prices on public information
only aﬀects output volatility, trading oﬀ incomplete nominal adjustment against public signal noise.
The use of private information, on the other hand, aﬀects volatility as well as price dispersion, and
creates a trade-oﬀ between the two: More conditioning on private information improves nominal
adjustment and reduces volatility, but increases price dispersion. Theorems 2 and 3 follow from a
distortion in this tradeoﬀ: relative to the DIO, private decisions attach too much weight to output
volatility, and too little weight to price dispersion. The source of this distortion is an externality
in information processing. The more each ﬁrm relies on its private information, the more diﬃcult
it becomes to forecast what will be the average price level and the real demand for each product.
When ﬁrms decide how much to condition their pricing decisions on private signals, they do not
take into account that by doing so, they are raising the overall level of demand uncertainty. This
increase in demand uncertainty is directly related to the overall amount of price dispersion: agents
thus don’t internalize the full social cost of price dispersion, and attribute too much weight to
private signals, relative to the planner.
While the present analysis presents a striking contrast with MS, it is consistent with inde-
pendent, but a closely related paper by Angeletos and Pavan (2004 - henceforth AP), who study
an investment model with complementarities due to technological spill-overs. AP also come to
the conclusion that public information is beneﬁcial, because it allows for a better coordination of
investment decisions to take advantage of technological spill-overs.
In the last part of the paper, I explore the connection between MS, AP and the present price-
setting model in more detail. I argue that the welfare analysis of information provision in coordi-
nation environments follows from similar principles as the classical welfare analysis of competitive
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use of information and the DIO. Abstracting from the speciﬁcs of any given application, I consider
a broad class of linear-quadratic interaction models, which give rise to a tradeoﬀ between volatility
and dispersion as discussed above for the monetary model. Within this class, I identify a payoﬀ
structure for which the equilibrium is exactly eﬃcient and coincides with the DIO; consequently,
any improvement in information is welfare-improving. Ineﬃciencies in information use, and the
non-desirability of certain types of information disclosures are then linked to distortions from this
eﬃcient payoﬀ structure. These ineﬃciencies in turn can be traced to external eﬀects that result
from the use of the available information.
The diﬀerent and contrasting welfare results can thus be explained by the existence of diﬀerent
externalities in the underlying payoﬀ structure: in the beauty contest model of MS, the reduced-
form assumptions artiﬁcially inﬂate the weight of dispersion in agents’ preferences, which leads
them to attribute too much weight to public information, relative to the DIO. In contrast, ﬁrms in
the monopolistic competition model do not internalize the full social cost of price dispersion, and
thereby pay too much attention to private information and too little attention to public information.
In AP, on the other hand, the technological spill-overs lead ﬁr m st or e s p o n dt o ol i t t l et oc h a n g e s
in fundamentals, even if these changes were commonly known. With incomplete information, ﬁrms
then respond too little to either signal, and better information of either type carries an additional
welfare beneﬁt from improving the overall response to fundamental changes. The opposite would
be true if ﬁrms were to react too much to changes in fundamentals, for example in the presence of
congestion externalities.
Related Literature: The idea that heterogeneous information may lead to substantial delays in
price adjustment appears ﬁrst in a path-breaking paper by Woodford (2002). Following Woodford,
various authors have noted the two-sided eﬀects of public information in reducing adjustment
delays, but potentially raising volatility due to noise.2 Much of this literature considered a reduced-
form model and focused on computationally solving the inﬁnite regress problem of ‘forecasting the
forecasts of others’ (Townsend 1983) that results from the presence of information heterogeneity.
In contrast, the present paper side-steps the inﬁnite regress issue to establish its main results
in a simple, yet internally consistent and fully micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model;
despite the complications imposed by the general equilibrium structure, I derive all results in closed
2See Hellwig (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) for discussions in the context of Woodford’s model, and Ui (2003)
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form, describe the underlying intuition, and discuss how they can be established more generally.
Moreover, the use of microfoundations allows for an analysis of normative questions for which the
reduced form analysis remains at best incomplete and suggestive, and is at worst misleading.
The normative part of this analysis builds on the paper by MS, whose welfare conclusions have
been questioned by several authors. A ﬁrst line of attack by Svensson (2005) argues that the eﬀect
emphasized by MS cannot arise for plausible parametrizations of their model. A second response
to MS, formulated by Heinemann and Cornand (2004), argues that public information disclosures
should be as precise as possible, but should not be made entirely public, i.e. should reach only a
fraction of market participants. Together with AP, this paper raises a third criticism by showing how
the welfare results of MS are altered by speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ considerations. More recently, Angeletos
and Pavan (2005) discuss the general principles underlying welfare and eﬃciency in incomplete
information economies, along lines similar to the ones presented in the last part of this paper. A
satisfactory resolution of this debate may depend on the application at hand, and it does require a
careful modelling of the underlying microfoundations.3
Section 2 presents the model, deﬁnes the equilibrium, and derives a series of preliminary results.
In section 3, I discuss the eﬀects of information heterogeneity for nominal adjustment and output
volatility. In section 4, I present the main welfare results. In section 5, I provide the general linear-
quadratic analysis, and the comparison with MS and AP. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 The Model
Apart from the information structure, I consider a standard model of incomplete nominal adjust-
ment with monopolistic ﬁrms, along the lines of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), with nominal
prices being preset, conditional on available information, before markets open. Time is discrete
and inﬁnite. There is a measure 1 continuum of diﬀerent intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0,1],
each produced by one monopolistic ﬁrm using labor as the unique input into production. There is
a ﬁnal consumption good, which is produced by a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector using the
3Related issues also arise in asset pricing contexts. For recent discussions of heterogeneous expectations and higher-
order uncertainty in asset pricing, see, for example, Allen, Morris and Shin (2003), or Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003, 2004). For related discussions of informational eﬃciency and information externalities in asset markets, see,
among others, Laﬀont (1985), Kyle (1989), Stein (1987), Vives (1988), Messner and Vives (2001), and Muendler
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continuum of intermediates according to a Dixit-Stiglitz CES technology with constant returns to
scale. On the consumption side, there is an inﬁnitely-lived representative household, with prefer-
ences deﬁned over the ﬁnal consumption good and labor supply in each period. The household faces
a Cash-in-Advance constraint, and has to ﬁnance consumption out of the current period’s nominal
balances. Each period is separated into two stages: at the beginning of the period, a nominal shock
is realized in the form of a stochastic lump sum transfer to the representative household. Each
intermediate goods producer receives a noisy private signal about this shock, in addition there is
a noisy public signal which is commonly available to everyone. On the basis of these signals, each
intermediate producer then sets the nominal price for his intermediate good. In the second stage,
markets open. Intermediates are traded at the posted prices, and intermediate producers hire labor
to satisfy the demand for their products at the posted prices. The wage rate and the ﬁnal goods
price adjust to clear the labor, goods and money markets.
Household Preferences: The representative household’s preferences over ﬁnal good con-
sumption and labor supply {Ct+τ,n t+τ}
∞





βτ (logCt+τ − nt+τ)
#
(1)
where β<1 denotes the discount rate, and Et (·) denotes the household’s expectations as of date
t. The household’s objective is to maximize (1) subject to its sequence of ﬂow budget constraints,
for τ =0 ,1,...
Pt+τCt+τ + Md
t+τ = Wt+τnt+τ + Md
t+τ−1 + Tt+τ + Πt+τ (2)
where Md
t+τ denotes the household’s demand for nominal balances, Pt+τ the price of the ﬁnal
consumption good, Wt+τ the nominal wage rate, Tt+τ a stochastic monetary transfer the household
receives at the beginning of each period, and Πt+τ the aggregate proﬁts of the corporate sector,
which are rebated to the household. Wage payments and corporate proﬁts are transferred to the
household at the end of each period. In addition, the household has to satisfy a Cash-in-Advance
constraint and ﬁnance its purchases of the consumption good out of its nominal balances after
receiving the monetary transfer; i.e. for τ =0 ,1,...
Pt+τCt+τ ≤ Md
t+τ−1 + Tt+τ (3)
The nominal money supply is stochastic, with the government making a lump sum transfer
Tt+τ = Ms
t+τ−Ms
t+τ−1 to the representative household at the beginning of each period. Speciﬁcally,C. Hellwig 8
I assume that mt ≡ logMs
t follows a random walk,






is i.i.d. over time, and τµ is a scaling parameter representing the inverse of the
shock’s variance. In each period, the household chooses ﬁnal good consumption Ct,l a b o rs u p p l ynt,
and money demand Md
t to maximize (1), subject to the constraints (2) and (3). Finally, I assume
that γ−1 ≡ βe
1
2τµ < 1. As I will show below, this assumption guarantees that the Cash-in-Advance
constraint is binding in every state and date.
Final Good Producers: A large number of ﬁnal goods producers uses the intermediate goods













Final goods producers maximize proﬁts, taking as given the market prices of intermediate and
ﬁnal goods. For a total demand Ct of the ﬁnal good by the household, a ﬁnal goods price Pt,a n d
input prices pi


























Intermediate Good Producers: Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopo-
listic ﬁrm using labor as the only input into production, according to a technology with decreasing
returns to scale. In order to produce y units of good i, ﬁrm i needs to hire n(y) units of labor,





with δ>1.4 In the ﬁrst stage of each period, intermediate producers receive noisy signals about
mt, when they must set their prices. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms receive a private signal about mt, denoted
4Alternatively, the production function y (n) is given by y (n)=[ δn]












is i.i.d. over time and across the population, and is independent of µt. τξ
represents the precision of the private signal. In addition, all ﬁrms observe a public signal zt,
zt = mt + vt,





is i.i.d. over time, and independent of µt and all ξi
t,a n dτv represents the pre-
cision of the public signal. Finally, I assume that mt−1 is commonly known at the beginning of date
t, which follows immediately from the public observation of the market wage rate Wt−1 at the end
of the previous period. Firm i’s information set =i







i’s nominal proﬁts πi
t, as a function of its price pi





















denotes the stochastic demand ﬁrm i faces for its product, given by (5).
If information were homogeneous and asset markets complete, the ﬁrm’s objective would be
determined simply by evaluating proﬁts according to state-prices. Here, such an approach leads to
the added complication that, if available to the ﬁrms, these asset prices would fully and commonly
reveal the underlying state; on the other hand, when markets are incomplete, the ﬁrm’s objective
need not be unambiguously speciﬁed. To get around this issue, I assume that Arrow-Debreu prices
are not available to ﬁrms, but instead each ﬁrm sets its price pi
t to maximize expected shareholder
value.5 Let Ei





denote the expectations operator, conditional on =i
t.T h e nﬁrm i’s


































To aggregate prices and proﬁts, I assume that the realized distribution of private signals across
ﬁrms (conditional on mt) is given by the conditional distribution of xi
t, almost surely, which implies
that the population average of the private signal,
R
xi
tdi equals mt,a l m o s ts u r e l y . 6 Since prices
5T h ei d e ab e h i n dt h i so b j e c t i v ei st h a te a c hﬁrm is instructed to set prices to maximize the representative house-
hold’s welfare, taking as given the other ﬁrms’ equilibrium pricing behavior. Under complete information, this
a p p r o a c hi se q u i v a l e n tt oe v a l u a t i n gp r o ﬁts according to state-prices.
6see Judd 1985 for the measure-theoretic issues involved in applying the Law of Large Numbers to a continuum
of random variables.C. Hellwig 10
pi
t are measurable with respect to private signals xi




















,a l m o s t
surely, where I let Φ(·|mt) denote the normal cdf of the private signal distribution, conditional on
a realization mt.
Equilibrium Deﬁnition: I focus on stationary equilibria, in which (i) intermediate good
prices pi







the representative household’s equilibrium demand for the ﬁnal good and nominal balances and its
supply of labor, as well as the ﬁnal good price and the nominal wage rate, are all functions only of
{zt,m t,m t−1}. This leads to the following equilibrium deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric, stationary equilibrium is deﬁned as a set of functions C (·), Md (·),





maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3).







(iii) p(·) maximizes (9), where c(p)=C (·)[P (·)]
θ p−θ.
(iv) All markets clear.
The equilibrium deﬁnition imposes symmetry across intermediate good producers, i.e. all ﬁrms
use an identical pricing rule p(·). Furthermore, by Walras Law, it is suﬃcient for market clearing
that the money market clears, or logMd
t = mt.
Preliminary Results: To characterize the equilibrium, I ﬁrst characterize optimal household
behavior and ex post market-clearing. I then use these results to characterize optimal price-setting
by the intermediate ﬁr m sa st h es o l u t i o nt oaﬁxed point problem. Lemma 1 characterizes the
household’s optimal behavior.
Lemma 1 The Cash-in-Advance constraint is always binding, and the household’s optimal con-






The equilibrium wage rate satisﬁes
Wt = γMs
t . (11)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 11






Wt, and hence the expected


















. After substituting (5),
















































i .( 1 3 )
Conjecture that logPt and mt, conditional on Ii
t, will be jointly normally distributed in equilibrium.
(13) can then be rewritten as:
logpi



















(θ − 1)(δ − 1)
1+θδ − θ


















r ∈ (0,1) denotes the degree of strategic complementarities in price-setting. (14) captures the
strategic interaction that results from monopolistic price competition: a ﬁrm’s optimal pricing
decision is an increasing function of its expectation about the average price in the market.7 The
novel aspect of the model presented here lies in the assumption that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in
their information. Hence, ﬁrms need to form expectations not only about nominal spending, but
also about the pricing decisions of other ﬁrms. Likewise, the risk adjustment in prices, which is
captured by V , includes not only “fundamental” uncertainty about Ms
t , but also strategic risk, i.e.
uncertainty about the other ﬁrms’ prices, or Pt.
Public Information Benchmark: As a useful benchmark, I ﬁrst suppose that information
is homogeneous, i.e. τξ =0 .A l lﬁrms then set the same price, and (14) can immediately be solved
7I ti sp o s s i b l et oe x t e n dt h ep r e s e n ta n a l y s i st oc a s e sw h e r epricing decisions are strategic substitutes. This case
may arise when labor supply is less than perfectly elastic. To be speciﬁc, suppose that representative household’s the
per period utility function is u(C,n)=l o gC −
1
1+σn
1+σ,w h e r eσ
−1 > 0 denotes the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
In that case, all our business cycle and welfare results go through identically, once one redeﬁnes r as r =
(θ−1)(δ−1)−δσ
1+θδ−θ ,
although some of the interpretations may change, when r<0, i.e. when supply is suﬃciently inelastic so that pricing
decisions become strategic substitutes. Detailed derivations for this case are available upon request.C. Hellwig 12
for the equilibrium pricing rule and the resulting output level:
logpi

































This equilibrium characterization has the following properties:
Proposition 1 In the absence of informational heterogeneity,
1. Equilibrium prices respond to the public signal exactly according to its Bayesian weight τv
τv+τµ.
2. Firms face no strategic uncertainty: Equilibrium prices can be perfectly forecast, and the risk
premium
δ/2
τv+τµ only takes into account the exogenous uncertainty about fundamentals.
3. The volatility of output is given by 1
τv+τµ, and is strictly decreasing in the precision of public
information.
With homogeneous information, equilibrium prices make eﬃcient use of the available informa-
tion, i.e. the weight that pricing decisions attribute to the public signal minimizes output volatility.
The only ineﬃciency in the market arises from the ﬁrms’ market power and the inﬂation tax, and








Against this benchmark, I now compare equilibrium prices when ﬁrms are heterogeneously informed,
i.e. τξ > 0. In this case, equation (14) implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium pricing rule as the solution
to a ﬁxed point problem which requires ﬁrms to make forecasts about the likely pricing strategies
of other ﬁrms. The solution to this ﬁx e dp o i n tp r o b l e mi sp r o v i d e di np r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Proposition 2 In the unique equilibrium in linear strategies, ﬁrms set prices according to
logpi
t = Γ0 + mt−1 +
τξ (1 − r)







τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
(zt − mt−1) (16)
and Pt and Ct satisfy:
logPt = Γ + mt−1 +
τv + τξ (1 − r)
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
µt +
τv
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
vt (17)
logCt = −Γ +
τµ
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
µt −
τv
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
vt (18)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 13












τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2 (19)
Γ0 = Γ +
θ − 1
2
τξ (1 − r)
2
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2
Proposition 2 characterizes the response of prices and consumption to monetary and informa-
tional shocks, and the eﬀect of incomplete, heterogeneous information on the expected level of prices
and output. Before discussing the resulting business cycle implications in detail, two observations
will be useful for the subsequent discussion.
First, note that relative to their respective information content in forecasting mt, ﬁrms reduce
the weight they attribute to their private signal, while expanding the weight that they attribute to
public sources of information, such as the prior mt−1 and the public signal zt. To understand why
this is the case, imagine at ﬁrst that all ﬁrms were to set prices according to their own expectation of
mt, i.e. in a way that responds to the private signal, the public signal, and the prior each according
to their relative information content τξ/(τµ + τv + τξ), τv/(τµ + τv + τξ),a n dτµ/(τµ + τv + τξ).
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 4 ) ,ﬁrms need to make forecasts about mt as well as the other ﬁrms’ pricing decisions.
Forecasts about mt weigh private and public signals and the prior indeed just according to their
relative information content. Forecasts of the other ﬁrms’ prices, however, rely more heavily on
the public signal and the prior. While the impact of public information on prices can be perfectly
inferred, since this information is shared by everyone, inference on the impact of private information
on prices remains imperfect, and relies on both public and private information - since on average
private signals reﬂect the true state, these signals are again weighted according to their exogenous
information content. Overall, a best response to the conjectured initial pricing rule which weighs
signals according to their precisions thus shifts weights towards public information and the prior,
and away from private information. This shifting of weights then feeds on itself: as other ﬁrms
rely more on public information and the prior, and less on private information, the impact of
public information on average prices increases, while the impact of private information decreases;
in response, each ﬁrm is even less willing to respond to private information, and even more eager
to respond to public information, and so on. In equilibrium, this process eventually converges at a
point, where the weight of private signals is discounted by a factor 1 − r, and the weight of public
information expanded accordingly, relative to their respective information content.C. Hellwig 14
Second, I comment on the composition of the expected price level Γ.T h e ﬁrst term in Γ
measures the eﬀect of monopolistic competition and the inﬂation tax on the price level and would
arise identically under common knowledge. The second term measures the eﬀect of information
heterogeneity. This term can be decomposed into a component due to output volatility, denoted
σ2
C, and a component due to price dispersion, denoted Σ2
p and deﬁned as the cross-sectional variance
of prices across ﬁrms. Σ2
p and σ2
C are given by:
Σ2
p =
τξ (1 − r)
2




[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2.















Theorem 1 discusses how the dynamic adjustment of prices and output depends on the in-
formational parameters τξ, τv,a n dτµ. It further discusses how σ2
C, Σ2
p,a n dΓ vary with the
informational parameters.
Theorem 1 Informational heterogeneity has the following implications for prices and consumption:
1. Informational heterogeneity reduces the response of prices to monetary shocks:
Holding the overall amount of information constant, a shift in signal precision from public to
private information reduces the adjustment of prices in response to monetary shocks.
2. The impact of public information: The higher is r, i.e. the more complementary pricing
decisions are, the larger is the impact of public information.
3. Output volatility: σ2
C is decreasing in τξ, but non-monotonic in τv and τµ.W h e n e v e r
τv + τµ >τ ξ (1 − r), σ2
C is decreasing in τv and τµ, otherwise it is increasing.
4. Price dispersion: Σ2
p is decreasing in τv and τµ, but non-monotonic in τξ.W h e n e v e r
τξ (1 − r) >τ v + τµ, Σ2
p is decreasing in τξ, otherwise it is increasing.
5. Deadweight output loss: Γ is decreasing in τv and τµ,b u ti fθ>2, Γ is non-monotonic
in τξ.W h e n e v e rτξ (1 − r) > θ−2
θ (τv + τµ), Γ is decreasing in τξ, otherwise it is increasing.
Theorem 1 outlines the implications of information heterogeneity for the dynamics of output
and prices, and establishes the tradeoﬀ between output volatility σ2
C and the price dispersion Σ2
p
that was discussed in the introduction.Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 15
As was noted above, the impact of private signals on prices is reduced, while the weight on
public signals and the prior is ampliﬁed, relative to their information content; moreover, these shifts
become larger the higher is r. As a consequence of the shift towards the prior, prices respond less to
monetary shocks than they would if all information was common; in other words, monetary shocks
have more important real eﬀects. As a consequence of the shift towards the public signal, prices
and consumption also respond more to noise in the public signal: Holding the overall precision
of information constant, the impact of public signal noise is ampliﬁed, if decisions become more
complementary. The ﬁrst two points of Theorem 1 thus summarize the main insights of Woodford
(2002), Hellwig (2002), and Amato and Shin (2003) in a simple model of incomplete nominal
adjustment.
The third, fourth and ﬁfth points lay out the implications for output volatility, price dispersion
and the deadweight output loss. Due to the disproportionate weight on public signals, more precise
public information may increase output volatility, but output volatility is unambiguously decreasing
in the precision of private information. Price dispersion is unambiguously decreasing in the precision
of public information, but may be increasing in the precision of private signals: When private
signals are inﬁnitely noisy, they do not aﬀect prices, and hence there is no price dispersion. On the
other hand, when private signals are inﬁnitely precise, ﬁrms almost exclusively condition on private
signals, but the signal dispersion across the population is small. Price dispersion is therefore largest
when the precision of private signals is neither too high, nor too low. Finally, the deadweight loss
of output Γ depends both on output volatility and on price dispersion, but its comparative statics
with respect to τξ, τv and τµ are driven by the latter, and an increase in the precision of private
information may increase the expected price level and reduce the expected level of output.
To conclude this section, I comment on the robustness and generality of these insights. To
k e e pt h ea n a l y s i ss i m p l e ,Ih a v em a d es o m es t r o n ga s s u m p t i o n s . I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h ef a c tt h a tmt
becomes common knowledge within one period precludes any more serious quantitative discussion
of the dynamic eﬀects of information heterogeneity over longer horizons, while the speciﬁcn a t u r e
of the information structure with exogenous public and private information raises the question to
what extent the present insights apply more generally. Moreover, the restriction to an environ-
ment with a single monetary shock raises the question what insights are likely to survive in richer
environments, that would allow for diﬀerent sources of uncertainty and multiple shocks. Finally,
one may wonder what assumptions about the environment must be made in order to maintain theC. Hellwig 16
impact of information heterogeneity in such a richer model over longer horizons; after all, markets
naturally aggregate and endogenously reveal some of the information to the ﬁrms.
Overall, I view the present model, in which all the action takes place within one period as a
useful and accurate summary of the eﬀects of information heterogeneity in such richer environments.
In a companion paper (Hellwig 2002), I provide a general characterization of equilibrium strategies
for models with heterogeneous information and decision complementarities as characterized by
(14). This characterization allows for arbitrary numbers of shocks, arbitrary sources of uncertainty,
arbitrary signal structures, and rich dynamics. To keep the inference problem simple, however,
I assume that all shocks become common knowledge after some arbitrary ﬁnite horizon T.T h i s
allows me to establish closed form solutions in matrices for the responses of prices to private signals,
and for the resulting aggregate impulse responses. Moreover, this closed form has exactly the same
properties that were described by prop. 2: equilibrium strategies reduce the weight attributed to
private signals by a factor 1−r, and after renormalization, amplify the weight of public signals and
the prior. Numerical examples show how this delays the response of prices over time and ampliﬁes
the eﬀect of signal noise just as it did in the simple example above.
Finally, one may wonder how the present micro-foundations must be adapted for such richer
environments. While a detailed discussion of this issue far exceeds the present space constraints,
preliminary results suggest that it is possible to develop rich micro-founded market models with
long-lived eﬀects of heterogeneous information. In such a model, the information endogenously
revealed from market prices and quantities leads to some qualiﬁcations, but the main insights
presented here remain in place: information heterogeneity delays price adjustment and ampliﬁes
the impact of noise in public observables.
4W e l f a r e R e s u l t s
I now turn to the welfare implications of public and private information in the present model
of monopolistic price-setting. The main results are stated in two theorems: In Theorem 2, I
establish the comparative statics of the representative household’s expected utility with respect to
the informational parameters. Theorem 3 compares the equilibrium to the socially optimal use of
the available information.
For the results, I focus on log-linear pricing rules of the form
logpi





+ Λ2 (zt − mt−1) (20)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 17
that are stationary over time, and fully incorporate the past money supply into the price.8 Any
rule of the form of (20) implies that the resulting consumption realizations logCt are i.i.d. normally
distributed over time, and furthermore, prices are lognormally distributed across ﬁrms. Moreover,
U ≡ Et−1 (logCt)−Et−1 (nt) is constant over time, and U/(1−β) equals the representative house-
hold’s expected life-time utility prior to knowing the current period’s monetary shock. As a function
of the parameters {Λ0,Λ1,Λ2} of the linear pricing rule (20), U is given by:
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τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2 (22)
This characterization of equilibrium welfare separates the social cost of the inﬂation tax and
the market power from the social cost of incomplete and heterogeneous information. The ﬁrst
component of the RHS of (22) measures the inﬂation tax and the market power, this term is
maximized when θ−1
γθ =1 , i.e. in the limiting case when θ →∞and γ → 1 (eliminating the
mark-ups and the inﬂation tax). The second component of the RHS of (22) measures the social
cost of heterogeneous information, and the resulting deadweight loss of output.
Theorem 2 (i) Ueq is strictly increasing in τv.
(ii) Ueq is monotonically increasing in τξ,i ﬀ θ ≤ 2.I fθ>2, Ueq non-monotonic in τξ,a n d
reaches a minimum when τξ (1 − r)=θ−2
θ (τv + τµ). Ueq is decreasing in τξ,w h e nτξ (1 − r) <
θ−2
θ (τv + τµ), and increasing, when τξ (1 − r) > θ−2
θ (τv + τµ).
Theorem 2 states that equilibrium welfare is strictly increasing in the precision of public in-
formation, and non-monotonic in the precision of private information: initially decreasing, but
increasing if τξ is suﬃciently large. The welfare considerations are therefore dominated by the cost
8Restricting attention to linear decision rules is obviously not without loss of generality. Nevertheless, it provides a
very simple ﬁrst step towards understanding the diﬀerence between private and social costs and beneﬁts of information
use.C. Hellwig 18
of price heterogeneity, which is decreasing in the precision of public, and non-monotonic in the
precision of private information.9
The conclusion of Theorem 2 is diametrically opposite to the results obtained by MS. While the
qualitative eﬀects of information provision on volatility is identical in the two papers, the diﬀerent
results are a consequence of diﬀerent preferences. In contrast to MS, the micro-foundations in the
present model reveal that the cost of price dispersion is the dominant component in determining
the welfare eﬀects of better public and private information.
It is possible to replicate the results of MS in a reduced-form version of the present model
that evaluates social welfare according to a quadratic loss function in inﬂation and output, along
the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983). While the Barro-Gordon model implies that it is always in
the social interest to improve public information to reduce aggregate volatility, when information
is homogeneous, it does not take into account the tradeoﬀ between output volatility and price
dispersion that arises with heterogeneous information. In the last section of this paper, I propose an
alternative model, which explicitly takes into account both volatility and dispersion, and illustrates
how the welfare eﬀects of public and private information provision depend on the underlying payoﬀ
structure.
4.2 Decentralized Information Optimum
How eﬃciently is the available information used in equilibrium? To answer this question, I next
derive the Decentralized Information Optimum, i.e. the linear decision rule that makes socially
optimal use of the locally available information. Maximizing (21) with respect to the coeﬃcients
Λ, Λ1 and Λ2,t h ec o e ﬃcients characterizing the decentralized information optimum are given by:
Λ∗ =
δ/2











τµ + τv + 1−r
θ τξ
(23)
The decentralized information optimum diﬀers from the equilibrium pricing rule in two ways: ﬁrst,
it eliminates the positive mark-up that was due to monopoly power and the inﬂation tax. Second,
9The welfare eﬀects of heterogeneous information also depend on the degree of monopolistic competition, which is
parametrized by the substitution elasticity θ.I n c r e a s i n gθ not only reduces mark-ups, but in addition increases the
complementarity in pricing decisions, r. It follows from (22) that the cost of informational heterogeneity is increasing
in θ;f u r t h e r m o r e ,w h e nτξ/(τµ + τv) is large, the welfare cost of heterogeneous information can become arbitrarily
large, as θ →∞ . Thus, in an economy with heterogeneous information, enhanced competition may by costly, if the
beneﬁts of reduced mark-ups are more than outweighed by the increased cost of information heterogeneity.Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 19
the decentralized information optimum shifts the weight in pricing decisions from private towards
public information. We immediately have the second theorem:
Theorem 3 Whenever τξ > 0, the equilibrium pricing rule puts too little weight on public informa-








Even though the equilibrium weight on private information is smaller than its Bayesian weight
in forecasting ﬁrst-order expectations, the market equilibrium puts too much weight on private
information, relative to the decentralized information optimum. By comparing the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions of the social planner’s problem to the coeﬃcients of the linear equilibrium rule, we can
trace this ineﬃciency to a negative externality in the conditioning on private information. The































































Therefore, while the equilibrium makes optimal use of public information to minimize volatility, it
does not fully internalize the trade-oﬀ between aggregate volatility and price dispersion that results
from the conditioning of prices on private information. This distortion can be traced to a wedge
between the private and the social cost of price dispersion. The more prices are conditioned on
private signals, the larger is the aggregate degree of strategic uncertainty about equilibrium prices,
i.e. the harder it becomes for any individual ﬁrm to forecast the average price. In conditioning
their prices on private information, ﬁrms do not take into account their own contribution to the
aggregate strategic risk. This creates a wedge between the private and the social costs of price
heterogeneity and implies that the private beneﬁt of conditioning prices on private signals exceeds
the social beneﬁt, which results in the excess reliance on private information. In our analysis, theC. Hellwig 20
cost of this uncertainty about equilibrium prices is reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s pricing equation in the
constant term Λ, which incorporates a risk premium due to the strategic uncertainty that ﬁrms
face.
5 A general linear-quadratic model
The stark contrast with the results reported in MS raises the question what modeling features
account for these diﬀerences, and whether one can determine some principles underlying the welfare
eﬀects of public or private information provision. This section explores these issues in a more general
framework, abstracting from the speciﬁc details of any given application. I argue that the welfare
eﬀects of information provision are similar to the classical welfare results of competitive market
allocation: when the equilibrium makes eﬃcient use of the available information, any improvement
in information is desirable. Non-desirability of public information disclosures or private information
gathering arises because of ineﬃciencies and externalities in the use of information. I further identify
the diﬀerent externalities driving the results in MS, here and in AP.
5.1 Set-up
Consider the following static normal-form game: There is a continuum of agents, indexed by
i ∈ [0,1]. Each agent simultaneously chooses an action ai ∈ R.L e t a(·):[ 0 ,1] → R denote
an action proﬁle. Each agent’s preferences are given by u, which is a function of the player’s own
action ai, the action proﬁle a(·), and a stochastic state variable µ:
u(ai,a(·),µ)=−(1 − r)(ai − µ)





2 dj +( 1− r)k2 (a − µ)




µ is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision τµ. r<1 denotes the degree of strategic
complementarities. Since the last three terms do not depend on ai,t h e yd on o ta ﬀect equilibrium
strategies, and enter purely as externalities. If µ is common knowledge, the best-response proﬁle is
given by ai =( 1− r)µ + ra,a n dai = a = µ constitutes the unique equilibrium of this game.
To deﬁne the social planner’s problem, I consider a utilitarian welfare criterion, W (a(·),µ)=Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 21
R
u(aj,a(·),µ)dj. W (a(·),µ) can be written as:




−(1 − r)(1− k2)(a − µ)
2 +2( 1− r)k3µ(a − µ).
The ﬁr s tt e r mc o r r e s p o n d st ot h es o c i a lc o s to ft h edispersion of actions. The second term measures
the social cost of aggregate volatility, i.e. the cost associated with having individual decisions out of
line with the aggregate state. I assume that k1 < 1 and k2 < 1, so that action dispersion and volatil-
ity are both socially costly. The last term in W (a(·),µ) measures the social cost that arises from
under-reaction or over-reaction to shocks: under common knowledge, social welfare is maximized
by ai = a =( 1+ρ)µ,w h e r eρ = k3
1−k2. k3 thus measures the over- or under-reaction of the common
knowledge equilibrium, relative to the social planner solution. If k3 =0 , the equilibrium attains
the social planner solution. If k3 > 0, the equilibrium responds too little, if k3 < 0, the equilibrium
responds too much to a change in µ. Here, I assume that k3 > min
©
−1
2 (1 − k2),−1
2 (1 − k1)
ª
,
which imposes an upper bound on any negative aggregate externality.10











. Private signals are iid across the population, and all signals are
conditionally independent of each other. Agents maximize E(u(ai,a(·),µ) | xi,z), implying that




τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
xi +
τv
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
z.( 2 6 )
To solve the social planner’s problem, I focus on the Decentralized Information Optimum,i n
which the planner dictates what decision rule has to be used by all agents. For simplicity, I again
restrict attention to linear decision rules of the form
ai = λ1xi + λ2z.
After substituting into the social planner’s problem, the expected social welfare, as a function of
10The social planner’s objective is equivalent to
f W (a(·),µ)=−(1 − k1)
Z
(aj − a)
2 dj − (1 − r)(1− k2)(a − (1 + ρ)µ)
2 ,
which measures aggregate volatility as the squared deviation of the average action from the socially optimal level.C. Hellwig 22
λ1 and λ2,i s :




















I conclude the discussion of the model set-up with the following useful benchmark result:
Proposition 3 When k1 = k2 = k3 =0 , the equilibrium pricing rule coincides with the decentral-
ized information optimum.
This proposition establishes a benchmark for which the equilibrium exactly attains the de-
centralized information optimum; moreover, it suggests a natural interpretation for the class of
objective functions described by (24). The coeﬃcients k1 and k2 measure the extent to which
individual decisions internalize the social costs of dispersion and volatility, while k3 measures the
importance of common knowledge ineﬃciencies. When k1 = k2 =0 , the equilibrium fully inter-
nalizes the social costs and beneﬁts of dispersion and volatility; k3 =0implies that the common
knowledge equilibrium attains the social optimum.
In a sense, this proposition is akin to the ﬁrst welfare theorem, which states that competitive
market allocations are Pareto-eﬃcient, when there are no external eﬀects. Since k1, k2,a n dk3
enter preferences purely as externalities, without aﬀecting optimal strategies, proposition 3 states
that in our model, the equilibrium is eﬃcient when there are no such externalities. As we will
discuss next, the converse is also true: when there are external eﬀects, the equilibrium is generally
ineﬃcient (except in special cases where diﬀerent externalities exactly oﬀset each other). And it
is only when such externalities are suﬃciently strong, that certain types of information disclosures
may be harmful.
For the subsequent analysis, it will be useful to deﬁne χ ≡ 1−k2
1−k1, which measures the importance
of the externality on aggregate volatility, relative to the externality in action dispersion in agent
preferences.
5.2 Main Results
I next examine how these externalities aﬀect equilibrium and optimal information use. Computing
equilibrium welfare from (26), one ﬁnds:
Weq = −(1 − r)(1− k2)
"
τµ + τv + 1
χ (1 − r)τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2 +2 ρ
1
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
#
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The ﬁrst term inside the square bracket measures the welfare cost of action dispersion and aggre-
gate volatility. The second term measures the common knowledge ineﬃciency. Taking ﬁrst-order











τµ + τv + χ(1 − r)τξ
(29)
The decentralized information optimum scales up the coeﬃcients of the decision rule by a factor 1+ρ
to correct for the common knowledge ineﬃciency, and adjusts the relative weights of the two signals
to optimally trade oﬀ between volatility and dispersion according to the social weights, which are
determined by χ. The next proposition summarizes the eﬀects of externalities in the heterogeneity-
volatility tradeoﬀ on equilibrium welfare, assuming that there is no common knowledge externality
(ρ =0 ). In that case, inspection of (29) shows that equilibrium strategies are eﬃcient if and only if







2 . The opposite is true when χ>1.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ρ =0 .
(i) If χ<1
2, Weq is monotonically increasing in τµ and τv, but non-monotonic in τξ,r e a c h i n g
a local minimum for given τµ and τv,w h e n(1 − r)τξ =( 1− 2χ)(τµ + τv).F o rl o w e rτξ, Weq is
decreasing, for higher τξ, Weq is increasing in τξ.




, Weq is monotonically increasing in τµ, τv,a n dτξ.
(iii) If χ>2, Weq is monotonically increasing in τξ, but non-monotonic in τµ and τv,r e a c h i n g
a local minimum for given τξ,w h e nτµ+τv =
χ−2
χ τξ (1 − r).F o rl o w e rτµ+τv, Weq is decreasing,
for higher τµ + τv, Weq is increasing in τµ + τv.
The parameter χ allows for a simple comparison between the private and the social tradeoﬀ
between aggregate volatility and action dispersion. When χ =1 , individual decisions fully inter-
nalize the social tradeoﬀ.W h e n χ<1, agents put too much weight on aggregate volatility, and
too little weight on action dispersion, relative to the social planner, and the opposite is true, when
χ>1. The implications of these wedges for equilibrium decisions become clear from comparing
the equilibrium to the social planner’s ﬁrst-order conditions for λ∗
1 and λ∗




















for λ1.C. Hellwig 24



































2 solve the ﬁrst-order condition for λ2, but violate the condition for λ1,i fχ 6=1 .
Once λ1 is given, λ2 only aﬀects aggregate volatility. Since private and social incentives are aligned
in minimizing aggregate volatility, λ2 fully internalizes the social beneﬁt of reducing aggregate
volatility in equilibrium. The conditioning of actions on private information on the other hand
generates a tradeoﬀ between action dispersion, which increases with λ1, and aggregate volatility,
which decreases with λ1. Private and social incentives with regard to this tradeoﬀ, and hence
the use of private information, are aligned, if and only if χ =1 , in which case the equilibrium
reaches the decentralized information optimum, and the provision of any type of information is
welfare-improving. If χ>1, individual incentives put too much weight on action dispersion and
the equilibrium rule puts too much weight on public signals. If this distortion is suﬃciently large (if
χ>2), better public information may be welfare-reducing. If χ<1, individual incentives put too
little weight on action dispersion and the equilibrium rule puts too much weight on private signals.
If χ<1
2, this distortion is so large that better private information may be welfare-reducing.
Finally, we discuss the eﬀects of common knowledge ineﬃciencies. In this case, it follows from
inspection of (29) that the DIO departs from equilibrium strategies in two ways, ﬁrst correcting
for the common knowledge ineﬃciency by scaling up both signal coeﬃcients by a factor 1+ρ,t h e n
adjusting the relative weights to correct for distortions in volatility and dispersion according to
χ. Since these two eﬀects may oﬀset each other, the absolute comparison between the equilibrium
and the decentralized information optimum remains ambiguous. Likewise, both of these eﬀects
are superposed in the analysis of equilibrium welfare eﬀects. In fact, once one replaces χ with
b χ = χ
1+2ρ
1+2χρ, proposition 4 applies identically to the model with common knowledge ineﬃciencies.
To understand this result, it is useful to decompose this condition for diﬀerent cases. When
ρ 6=0 , b χ modiﬁes χ to account for the interaction between the common knowledge ineﬃciency ρ
and the informational distortion χ.I fχ =1 , b χ = χ =1 , welfare is increasing in all signal precisions,
and the decentralized information optimum merely scales up the equilibrium decision rule by ρ to
correct for the common knowledge ineﬃciency. If χ 6=1 ,d i ﬀerent scenarios arise, depending on
whether there is over- or under-reaction in the common knowledge equilibrium: If ρ>0,i . e . i f
there is a positive aggregate externality, the negative eﬀect of more precise informaton that mayHeterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 25
result from a distortion in the volatility-dispersion tradeoﬀ is mitigated by the fact that better
information improves the overall response to shocks. To see this, note that either 1 >χ ,i nw h i c h
case 1 > b χ>χ ,o r1 <χand 1 < b χ<χ ; in both cases non-monotone welfare eﬀects arise for a
smaller range of parameters once ρ>0.I fρ<0, i.e. if there is a negative externality, then more
precise information overall increases the cost of this aggregate externality, which further increases
any negative welfare eﬀect that may be due to a distortion χ in the volatility-dispersion tradeoﬀ;
in this case, either 1 >χand 1 >χ>b χ,o r1 <χand 1 <χ<b χ. In both cases, non-monotone
welfare eﬀects arise for a larger range of parameters.
In summary, therefore, the present analysis has shown how ineﬃciencies and the non-desirability
of information provision, both rely on externalities in the use of information.
5.3 Applications
To conclude, I discuss how the results presented in section 2-4 of this paper, as well as in MS and
AP map into this quadratic model.
This paper: In the model of incomplete nominal adjustment developed in sections 2-4, the
social objective was given by (21) as











where W (λ1,λ 2)=














The ﬁrst two terms of W (λ1,λ 2) account for the cost of aggregate volatility, while the third accounts
for the cost of action dispersion. This objective maps into the general model for parameters
k1 =1− θ<0 and k2 = k3 =0 , which implies that χ = θ−1 and ρ =0 . There is a negative
externality associated with action dispersion; individual decisions do not fully internalize the social
cost of action dispersion, but they fully internalize the cost of aggregate volatility. Equilibrium
prices rely too much on private information, relative to the social optimum. When θ is suﬃciently
large, providing better private information may reduce welfare. The economic reason for this
externality is that ﬁrms do not internalize the cost of strategic risk that is imposed on others by
conditioning prices on private information.C. Hellwig 26
Morris and Shin (2002): In MS, individual objectives are given by:






















The stark modelling assumption in MS is that the coordination motive enters individual pref-
erences through a zero-sum component that washes out in the social welfare function. Rewriting
Li, L and u(ai,a(·),µ) yields










u(ai,a(·),µ)=−(1 − r)(ai − θ)






The objective function in MS maps into the present framework as the case where k1 = r and
k2 = k3 =0 , which implies that χ =( 1− r)
−1 > 1. Relative to the social tradeoﬀ, agents place
too little weight on the costs of aggregate volatility, and too much weight on dispersion. The
equilibrium hence relies too heavily on public information, and too little on private information.
Furthermore, when r>1/2, better public information may be welfare-reducing.11
Angeletos and Pavan (2004 a,b): AP consider a static investment model with technological
spillovers. In their set-up, agents take investment decisions ai to maximize proﬁts, which are given
by
u(ai,a(·),µ)=2 Aai − a2
i
where the productivity parameter A is given by A = ra +( 1− r)µ,a n dr<1/2. µ is interpreted
as an aggregate technology shock. This objective can be rewritten as:
u(ai,a(·),µ)=−(1 − r)(ai − µ)
2 − r(ai − a)
2 + r(a − µ)
2 +2 rµ(a − µ)+µ2.( 3 0 )
AP’s model translates into the present framework as k1 =0 , k2 = r
1−r and k3 = r
1−r,i m p l y i n g
χ = 1−2r
1−r < 1, ρ = r
1−2r,a n db χ = 1
1+r. The model with investment complementarities generates
11While Morris and Shin motivate their choice of an objective function by an intuitive appeal to Keynes’ analogy
of portfolio investment decisions with a beauty contest, they do not model such an investment game explicitly.Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 27
under-investment under common knowledge, and an informational distortion under heterogeneous
information, which leads strategies to attribute too much weight to the costs of aggregate volatility,
relative to the social planner. The decentralized information optimum corrects for the two inef-






2, i.e. the equilibrium responds too
little to both types of signals, and equilibrium welfare is increasing in both signal precisions. In
contrast to MS and this paper, the investment complementarity in AP not only distorts the private
weights on action dispersion and aggregate volatility, but also implies that the common knowledge
equilibrium is ineﬃcient. While the ﬁrst distortion shifts strategies towards more reliance on pri-
vate information, the common knowledge ineﬃciency dominates the informational distortion in the
welfare discussion and implies that the equilibrium reacts too little to either signal. Consequently,
improving either type of information is welfare-enhancing, because it increases the response to a
shock in µ, which reduces underinvestment.12
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Following Woodford (2002), this paper has developed a fully-microfounded model of nominal ad-
justment, in which heterogeneous information among monopolistically competitive ﬁrms increases
persistence of nominal shocks and ampliﬁes the impact of public signals on prices. The paper then
discusses the welfare eﬀects of public and private information provision in terms of a tradeoﬀ be-
tween output volatility and price dispersion. Overall, the welfare eﬀects of informational dispersion
are determined by the latter: Improving private information may be welfare-reducing, but better
public information always increases welfare. This result follows from an information externality
that prevents ﬁrms from internalizing the full social cost of price dispersion for the allocation of
resources, and thereby creates a wedge between the private and the social beneﬁts of conditioning
prices on private information.
To relate the present analysis to contrasting results by Morris and Shin (2002) and similar
results by Angeletos and Pavan (2004), the last part of this paper explores the tradeoﬀ between
volatility and dispersion in abstract terms. Within this general framework, the welfare eﬀects of
12In an alternative version, AP consider the case where there are investment complementarities, but no aggregate
under-investment. In that case, the equilibrium conditions too heavily on private information and too little on public






.T h i sc a s em a p s
into the present model, when k2 =
r
1−r and k1 = k3 =0 ,s ot h a tχ =
1−2r
1−r < 1 and ρ =0 .C. Hellwig 28
improved public or private information are traced to distortions in the volatility-dispersion tradeoﬀ
and to externalities that generate ineﬃciencies, even when shocks are common knowledge.
While the model does not address policy issues, it raises new questions in that direction. Tradi-
tionally, the importance of transparent information provision for monitoring purposes is emphasized
within a principal-agent framework with time-inconsistency in the absence of policy commitment.
Recently this literature has received renewed attention in contributions that focus on the interplay
between a privately informed policy maker, and a homogeneously informed private sector (see, for
example, Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe 2003, and Moscarini 2003). When private sector agents are
heterogeneously informed, there are additional channels through which a privately informed policy
maker may inﬂuence market outcomes: First, the disclosure of such private information through
public announcements or policy actions provides public information which may improve the coor-
dination of private decisions among heterogeneously informed market participants.13 Second, even
without conveying information, policies interventions which alter the distortions in the tradeoﬀ
between volatility and dispersion or aﬀect the costs of information acquisition and processing have
novel implications for an economy with heterogeneously informed agents. I leave an analysis of
these questions to future work.
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7A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 . Substituting the budget constraint, the household’s optimization problem
can be rewritten as:























s.t. Pt+τCt+τ ≤ Md
t+τ−1 + Tt+τHeterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 31
Let θt+τ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the period t + τ Cash-in-Advance Constraint. The
























We check that the proposed solution Ct+τ =
Ms
t+τ














> 0, so that the Cash-in-Advance constraint is binding in every
period and in every state (justifying that Ct+τ =
Ms
t+τ
Pt+τ ). Next, we check that the second ﬁrst-order









































Thus, the two ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed. It is also immediate that the transversality
condition holds, and that the money market clears.
Proof of proposition 1. With homogeneous information, all ﬁrms set identical prices,
logpi








+ E (mt | mt−1,z t)+
δ
2
V (mt | mt−1,z t),
where E (mt | mt−1,z t)=mt−1 + τv
τµ+τv (zt − mt−1) and V (mt | mt−1,z t)= 1
τµ+τv.
Equilibrium characterization (proposition 2). A standard approach for characterizing
the equilibrium pricing rule is to conjecture and verify a linear pricing rule for logpi
t. Here, I
provide an alternative which highlights the role of higher-order expectations about fundamentalsC. Hellwig 32
and provides some insights into the eﬀects of private and public information for dynamic price
adjustment, along lines similar to Woodford (2002), MS, and Hellwig (2002). To begin, it is useful
to rewrite (14). Using the deﬁnition of Pt,w eh a v e
(1 − θ)logPt =l o g
Z
(1 − θ)logpi
































p denotes the conjectured cross-sectional variance of prices, and logpt ≡
R
logpi
tdi =l o g Pt +
θ−1
2 Σ2
p, almost surely. Taking averages and substituting forward, logpi
t is given by
logpi























t (mt) is recursively deﬁned by: E
(0)
























Et [logpt | zt,m t−1] and limk→∞ E
(k)









t (mt)=0 , hence logpi
t satisﬁes
logpi











We have thus transformed the ﬁxed point problem of forecasting equilibrium prices into one
of determining a weighted average of higher-order expectations; i.e. i’s expectation of the average
expectation of the average expectation ... (repeat s times) ... of mt. The solution to this problem
is uniquely determined from the information structure. When all information is common, the law
of iterated expectations implies that the higher-order expectations all collapse to the common ﬁrst-
order expectation. However, the law of iterated expectations does not apply to average expectations
in the presence of information heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we can characterize all higher-order











τµ + τv + τξ
(zt − mt−1)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 33
Averaging over i,w eﬁnd the ﬁrst-order average expectation:
Et (mt)=mt−1 +
τξ
τµ + τv + τξ
(mt − mt−1)+
τv
τµ + τv + τξ
(zt − mt−1)








τµ + τv + τξ
£
Ei


















τµ + τv + τξ
¸
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τµ + τv + τξ
¶2!
(zt − mt−1)























τµ + τv + τξ
¶s+1!
(zt − mt−1)


































































τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
(zt − mt−1)
This characterization illustrates the shift in weights away from private signals towards the prior
and the public signal in the higher-order expectations. The reason for this shift can be seen by
considering the inference problem underlying higher-order expectations: The impact of the public
information on the other ﬁrms’ expectations is perfectly forecastable, because public information
is shared by all ﬁrms. The private signal, only enters into the forecast of the other ﬁrms’ private
signals, and hence its weight is declining in higher orders of expectations.C. Hellwig 34
To complete the characterization, I solve for the remaining undetermined coeﬃcients. From




2.U s i n g t h e
fact that (θ − 1)(1 − r)= rδ
δ−1 and 1+ r
δ−1 = θ(1 − r),w eh a v e
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·
1+
(θ − 1)(1 − r)τξ
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·
(θ − 1)(1 − r)τξ
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·τµ + τv + τξ + r
δ−1τξ
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· r
δ−1τξ
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
¸2
= δ2 τµ + τv + τξ











τµ + τv + τξ
¶2#
= δ2τµ + τv + τξ +2 r
δ−1τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
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δ−1τξ













τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Apart from the non-monotonicity results, the theorem follows imme-
diately from proposition 2. For the non-monotonicity results, note that for generic x1,x 2 > 0,
∂
∂x1








x1 (x1 + x2)
which is positive if x1 <x 2 and negative otherwise. For part 5,
∂
∂τξ
[ln(τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ) − 2log(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ)]
=
θ(1 − r)
τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ
−
2(1− r)
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
=
(1 − r)[θ(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ) − 2(τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ)]
(τµ + τv + θ(1 − r)τξ)(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 35
w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e ,i fa n do n l yi f(θ − 2)(τµ + τv) >θ(1 − r)τξ, and negative otherwise.
Derivation of equation (21). For any linear pricing rule given by (20), prices are normally
distributed in the cross section, and consumption is i.i.d. normally distributed over time. Let
] logC denote the mean of log-consumption, σ2
C the variance of consumption, Σ2
p the cross-sectional
dispersion of prices, and logpt the mean of log-prices. In terms of the parameters of the linear
pricing rule, the ﬁrst three are given by:




p = Λ; σ2












We can express the per period expected utility in terms of ] logC, σ2
C and Σ2
p as:
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The proof is completed by substituting the above expressions for ] logC, σ2
C and Σ2
p in terms of Λ,
Λ1 and Λ2.





















































Derivation of equation (23). Taking ﬁrst-order conditions of (21) with respect to Λ, Λ1,C. Hellwig 36



































Solving these conditions with respect to Λ, Λ1,a n dΛ2 yields Λ∗, Λ∗
1,a n dΛ∗
2,a n dΛ∗







Proof of theorem 3. Follows immediately from Propositions 2 and equation (23).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 . When k1 = k2 = k3 =0 ,t h eﬁrst-order conditions of (27) w.r.t.





τv, from which the proposition follows immediately.
Derivation of equation (29). Taking ﬁrst-order conditions of (27) with respect to λ1














τv, from which the result follows immediately.
Proof of proposition 4. Rewriting (28), we have
Weq = −(1 − r)(1− k2)












= −(1 − r)(1− k2)(1+2ρ)
"
τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
[τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ]
2
#
where b χ = χ
1+2ρ





τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
−
2
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
=
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ − 2
³
τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´
³
τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´









τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´
(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ)Heterogeneous Information and Public Information Disclosures 37
∂ ln(−Weq)





τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´ −
2
τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ
=
(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ) − 2b χ(τµ + τv) − 2(1− r)τξ
b χ
³
τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´
(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ)
=
(τµ + τv)(1− 2b χ) − (1 − r)τξ ³
τµ + τv + 1
b χ (1 − r)τξ
´
(τµ + τv +( 1− r)τξ)





(1 − r)τξ, and increasing in
τξ,i fa n do n l yi f(τµ + τv)(1− 2b χ) > (1 − r)τξ.